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Nationhood as Cultural Repertoire: Collective Identities … 149 universal processes result in heterogeneous cognitive representations of the nation across (and possibly within) countries. While the hegemony of nationalism in contemporary society is widely recognized, how people understand their nations and how they deploy those understandings in practice require careful empirical study. Given the tension between the universality of the national idea and the specificity of its cultural manifestations, such research must attend to both within-and betweencountry differences, which requires a comparative research design.
I suggest a middle ground solution to the problem of comparison in nationalism studies. Consistent with much contemporary research in this field, I reject the notion of coherent national cultures and absolute between-country differences, instead viewing national identities as multifaceted, heterogeneous and contested. At the same time, however, I propose a systematic way to study patterns of variation within and across countries by drawing on past research on national cultural repertoires (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) and multiple traditions of nationalism (Smith 1997) . Using survey data from two exemplary cases in nationalism research-France and Germany-I demonstrate that aggregate country differences on a range of nationalism variables mask the existence of four distinct dispositions towards the nation within each country, which I call liberal, disengaged, restrictive and ardent (cf. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) . With some notable differences, these repertoires of nationhood share a common cultural logic across the two countries. I further show that the manner in which respondents in both France and Germany understand their nations is associated with their views on immigration, economic protectionism and European integration, as well as their support for radical right parties.
While this chapter relies on quantitative methods that have not been widely used in the study of nationalism (but see Bonikowski 2013; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) , its contribution is not solely methodological. The analytical approach taken here has broader theoretical implications for how nationalism scholars should think about cultural similarity and difference. My findings suggest that not only is the idea of the nation state deeply institutionalized across countries, as argued by banal nationalism research, but also that the repertoires of meanings attributed to the nation may themselves be uniform across otherwise distinct political cultures. By mapping these beliefs both within and across countries, the chapter furthers the objective of everyday nationalism research to attend to micro-level meanings, while taking advantage of the ability of survey analysis to make distributional claims about popular attitudes.
Varieties of Nationalism in Comparative Research
The traditional comparative approach to nationalism research was primarily interested in the identification of nations' core values, which were thought to be widely shared within national communities, endowing their members with a sense of collective distinctiveness and common solidarity. In this vein, scholars of the US placed at the core of the nation's political culture the key tenets of the American Creed, such as individualism, liberty and scepticism of political authority (Hartz 1955; Lipset 1990; de Tocqueville 1969 de Tocqueville [1835 ). Sincere belief in these principles was seen as the main prerequisite for membership in the nation, far outweighing any ascriptive criteria, like native-born status and ancestry. While the specific mix of national values was uniquely American, the idea that the nation is primarily a political community was seen as typical of a civic variety of nationalism, which scholars identified with English-speaking settler societies and the oldest of Europe's modern nation states, where the state came to exist first and the nation followed (Kohn 1944) . Among the latter, France was a frequent exemplar: a nation based not on ancestral lineage but on a common belief in republican values, which placed active participation in the political sphere at the core of its members' citizenship duties (Brubaker 1992) .
Against the example of French republicanism, scholars often placed the German Kulturnation (Meinecke 1970 (Meinecke [1907 ), where common descent and shared traditions served as the primary bases for national belonging. This ethnocultural form of nationalism was theorized and advocated by von Herder (2002 Herder ( [1792 ) and came to occupy a central role in Kohn's (1944) ethnic-civic binary typology, according to which Germany was an example of a broader, non-Western nationalist tradition. The ethnic-civic dichotomy animated nationalism research for many years, as did the broader scholarly tradition of distilling essential properties of national political cultures (Schulman 2002; Smith 1997) .
Over time, however, this approach became increasingly unpopular, not least because of the contradictions observable in seemingly exemplary cases. The US, an ostensible paragon of civic nationalism, had a long history of racial domination from slavery to legally sanctioned segregation to contemporary discrimination and systemic racism (Smith 1997) . France was a nation of civic republicanism, but also of Vichyera persecution of Jews and other ethnic and cultural minorities and of contemporary anti-Muslim sentiments (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Marrus and Paxton 1981) . Germany had a long and tragic history of ethnoracial violence, and it reckoned with its Nazi past after the Second World War and opened its door to migrants from Eastern Europe and Turkey in more recent decades (Joppke 2007) . Such examples led Brubaker (2004) to declare that when taken seriously, the ethnic-civic categories constitute 'empty sets ' (p. 137) . While the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may retain some utility for describing individual-level attitudes, its empirical validity for characterizing entire nations or geographic regions has been further challenged by survey research (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002) .
The decline of the ethnic-civic typology has been further aided by a general distrust towards essentialist cultural claims. The overarching project of identifying core principles of national political cultures came to be seen as an uncritical perpetuation of myths that were themselves the product of nationalist ideology (Brubaker 2004) . The result has been a movement away from cross-national comparisons and towards individual-level analyses, which privilege lived experience, the situational contextuality of identification processes and unpatterned variation (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008) . This tendency has been no less pronounced in survey-based research than in qualitative work. While interview-based studies seek to uncover the mechanisms of nationalism-in-practice (e.g. Miller-Idriss 2009), survey analyses tend to focus on specific nationalism variables, which are abstracted from individual
respondents and correlated with a range of outcomes of interest (e.g. Schatz et al. 1999) .
Among the many strengths of these approaches has been their commitment to rigorous empirical analysis, their ability to demonstrate nationalism's importance (and lack thereof ) in everyday interactions and their attention to the implications of nationalist beliefs for other domains of social life. These advances, however, have come at the cost of a reduced ability to carry out meaningful cross-national research.
Cultural Repertoires: An Alternative Comparative Framework
If we accept that nationalism in everyday practice is more heterogeneous and messier than classic accounts of uniform national identities had assumed, how might we conceive of macro-level comparisons in a way that attends to this underlying cultural complexity? Comparisons of average responses to attitudinal surveys are overly reductive, while inferences about popular beliefs from public narratives risk reproducing dominant nationalist ideologies. An alternative solution is suggested by comparative research in cultural sociology. Instead of essentializing cultural differences to the national level, scholars can look for heterogeneous cultural repertoires within countries and ask whether those repertoires resemble what is observed in other national contexts (Lamont and Thévenot 2000) . Researchers have demonstrated, for instance, that in producing moral evaluations of social groups, American and French respondents have access to similar discursive options, relying either on a market-based logic or that of civic solidarity (Lamont 2000) . What differs across the countries is the relative prevalence of these evaluative frames. Similarly, Ferree (2003) shows that what distinguishes abortion discourse in the US and Germany is not the content of the arguments but rather the relative prominence of competing narratives in the public sphere: what is mainstream in the US is radical in Germany and vice versa.
This suggests an approach to nationalism that identifies multiple patterns of beliefs within countries and then compares their content and relative prevalence across countries. Indeed, there is precedent for this type of analytical strategy. Though it does not engage in comparison and emphasizes legal decisions instead of popular attitudes, Rogers Smith's historical research (1997) disaggregates US nationalism into three distinct traditions (liberal, civic republican and ethnocultural) that have competed with one another throughout the country's history. The struggles and occasional compromises between elites espousing these ideologies have produced a complex and contradictory collection of immigration laws that combine elements from each of the three traditions.
While revealing different belief structures than those identified by Smith (1997) , my past work has shown that the multiple traditions approach can be adapted to the analysis of survey data in order to identify subnational communities of thought that conceptualize the nation in distinct ways (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) . Americans combine beliefs about the nation's symbolic boundaries, feelings of pride in the nation and the state and attitudes towards other countries in patterned ways that reveal four underlying cultural schemas (I refer to these as disengaged, creedal or liberal nationalist, restrictive nationalist and ardent nationalist). In the present chapter, I employ a similar strategy to examine popular nationalism in France and Germany, the two countries long held up as exemplars of civic and ethnic nationalism, respectively. I demonstrate that, much like in the US case, each national sample contains four distinct orientations towards the nation, which are similar in overall structure across the countries. Moreover, espousal of these nationalist beliefs is associated with important political attitudes-in this case, those related to support for radical-right parties. These findings suggest that meaningful, bottom-up and person-centred cross-national comparisons are possible, but they require a shift away from standard variable-based methods of survey analysis. While broadly consistent with the theoretical orientation of qualitative studies on everyday nationalism, the survey-based approach proposed here makes it possible to inductively identify patterns of beliefs based on nationally representative samples, to systematically measure their prevalence across groups and to examine their associations with other social and political attitudes.
Data and Methods
To examine the variation in popular understandings of the nation in France and Germany, I rely on data from the National Identity III Supplement to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP is a cross-national survey based on representative samples from over 30 countries, which has been administered annually since 1985. The national identity module contains a wide range of questions about the nation, as well as items concerning political preferences, immigration, economic and cultural protectionism and supranational institutions. The surveys were administered in France in 2013 and in Germany in 2014, resulting in sample sizes of 2017 and 1717 respondents, respectively. After listwise deletion of missing data on sociodemographic covariates, the sample sizes were reduced to 1049 French respondents and 858 German respondents.
The usual strategy in survey-based studies of nationalism is to hone in on a specific variable or item scale and correlate it with other social attitudes and policy preferences. Scholars have typically focused on the intensity of national identification (Li and Brewer 2004) , ascriptive and elective criteria of national belonging (Kunovich 2009 ), domainspecific national pride (Smith and Kim 2006) or hubristic comparisons of the nation with the rest of the world (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) . Indeed, these topics constitute four groups of questions within a 23-item battery that has been featured in multiple waves of the ISSP. My analyses rely on these same items, but in contrast to past research, I simultaneously include all of them in my models, based on the assumptions that people's cognitive representations of the nation are multifaceted and that the meaning of any given item is a function of its relationship to other items (DiMaggio 1997; Mohr 1998) .
The method I employ to analyse the distribution of responses within and across countries is latent class analysis (LCA) (Hagenaars 1993 ). This approach makes it possible to identify clusters of respondents who share similar response profiles across multiple survey questions. The analyst selects the appropriate survey items to include in the model and chooses a target number of clusters (referred to as 'latent classes'); an iterative algorithm then divides the sample into the predetermined number of clusters in a manner that maximizes their internal homogeneity and mutual differentiation. Multiple models with different numbers of latent classes can be compared based on fit statistics in order to determine which model most accurately describes the data. Once the optimal model is selected, the LCA procedure generates class membership probabilities for every respondent, assigns each respondent to the class with the highest membership probability and produces descriptive statistics for the variables of interest (in this case, nationalist attitudes), which can be used to interpret the content of the classes. The result is a set of discrete groups of respondents, each characterized by a particular distribution of attitudes.
If we take survey responses to be indicative of beliefs, then patterns of responses that appear to 'hang together' within latent classes can be interpreted as indicative of distinct orientations towards the nation (importantly, this does not imply that respondents belonging to a particular class are part of a self-conscious group or even that they hold shared beliefs for the same reasons). We can then ask whether the similarity of nationalist beliefs among these subsets of respondents is systematically associated with other social and political attitudes, particularly if those attitudes relate closely to the nation. It is also possible to determine what sociodemographic variables predict membership in each latent class.
It is worth emphasizing that the latent class approach is fundamentally person-centred, even if my supplementary analyses rely on regression analyses: the nationalism profiles are derived entirely from the co-occurrence of attitudinal responses within individuals and each respondent is assigned unambiguously to one of the nationalism profiles. This makes it quite different from variable-based methods that abstract specific cultural and demographic traits from individuals and look for net associations after controlling for other predictors. 
France and Germany: Aggregate Differences
In order to orient the analyses, it is worthwhile to consider what differences we might expect to find between France and Germany at the aggregate level in 2013-2014. The simplest predictions come from Kohn's (1944) ethnic-civic model: on average, Germans should favour more restrictive definitions of the nation's symbolic boundaries, while the French should be more inclined to define the nation in primarily civic terms (Brubaker 1992 ). This distinction is likely to be muted, however, as a result of Germany's gradual shift towards more permissive citizenship regulation, which culminated in major reforms in 1999 (Joppke 2007) . Indeed, past studies have found Germans to be less supportive of ethnic definitions of the nation than expected (Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002) .
On national pride, we would expect Germany to score lower than France due to continued legacies of the Second World War in German collective memory and national identity (Smith and Jarkko 1998; Smith and Kim 2006) . These differences should be particularly marked on questions related to the military and history but much less so on items related to the economy and the welfare state (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Evans and Kelley 2002) . For the same reason, we should expect Germans to be less likely to express chauvinistic attitudes towards the rest of the world.
Finally, expectations concerning differences in the overall strength of national identification are less obvious. Neither country has strong regionalist movements that challenge the national project and both are economic and political leaders in the European Union, which should result in relatively similar pressures towards supranational identification (which is generally quite weak across Western European countries [Fligstein et al. 2012] ).
To evaluate these predictions, one can simply compare the variable distributions across the two countries. The country means, standard deviations and significance tests of between-country differences for the 23 nationalism variables are presented in Table 1 . Contrary to expectations, the French sample placed stricter restrictions on national membership on all but one indicator: religion. While the contrasts were the most marked for elective criteria of belonging, all differences, including those for ethnocultural criteria, were statistically significant. That is, while both countries favour civic over ethnic bases of national membership, on average, the French appear to be more exclusionary than the Germans. That religion would be an exception to this pattern is understandable, given the dominance of secular republicanism in French political culture (but note that this item has the lowest mean in both countries). On measures of pride in the military and in history, the results are consistent with expectations: on average, Germans are much less likely to express pride in these aspects of their country than the French. The same is true of pride in the social security system, achievements in the arts and literature and three of five chauvinism questions (preference for the country's citizenship, lack of shame in the country and unconditional support for the country). On the remaining pride and chauvinism questions, however, Germans score higher than the French, contrary to predictions based on past literature. The contrast is the greatest for pride in the country's economic achievements. Finally, on general identification with the nation, the mean for the French sample is higher than that for the German sample.
These results challenge arguments that classify these countries as belonging to two distinct types of nationalism. In general, respondents in both countries exhibit similar patterns of beliefs: they privilege civic over ethnic criteria of belonging, express moderate pride in their nations (more so in its intellectual achievements than institutions) and moderate levels of chauvinism and feel close to their nations. Because these analyses are carried out at the national level, however, they cannot estimate the heterogeneity of national self-conceptions within the countries. To do so, it is necessary to rely on methods that simultaneously enable within-and between-country comparisons. Latent class analysis is one such approach.
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Repertoires of Nationhood in France and Germany
To identify clusters of respondents with similar dispositions towards the nation within each country, I performed separate latent class analyses (LCA) on the two samples. In both cases, a cross-model comparison of the approximate weight of evidence (AWE) criterion, which evaluates model fit while taking into account parsimony and classification error, suggested that a four-class solution represented the most reasonable fit to the data. 1 The distributions of the 23 nationalism variables across the four classes in each country are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
Despite some cross-national differences in the class-specific response probabilities, the four varieties of nationalism yielded by LCA appear to have a similar logic in both Germany and France (and to also bear resemblance to those found in the US [Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016] ). In both countries, two of the classes appear to occupy opposite ends of a continuum between a general rejection and general endorsement of most of the nationalism items in the survey. The first of these classes, whose members I call the disengaged, is characterized by low levels of national attachment, strong disavowal of ethnic criteria of national membership, relatively low levels of pride in the nation and disagreement with most of the chauvinism items. 2 It accounts for 19% of the sample in France and 13% in Germany. The second class, which I call ardent nationalist, expresses the opposite pattern of attitudes: strong national identification, an embrace of all barriers to national membership (of which religion receives the lowest support), a high degree of pride in all aspects of the nation (including the military and history in Germany) and relatively high levels of chauvinism. Ardent nationalists represent 21% of the sample in France and 13% in Germany.
The remaining two classes do not fall on the same continuum. Respondents assigned to the first, which I call liberal nationalist (cf. Tamir 1993), largely reject ethnocultural criteria of national membership, but exhibit strong national identification and moderate levels of pride and chauvinism. Liberal nationalism is the most prevalent of the four classes, representing 46% of the French sample and 50% of
It is possible that this response pattern is a result of discontent with the direction in which the country has moved and a desire to restrict national membership, perhaps in an effort to restore its past demographic composition. If so, we may expect members of this class to be particularly supportive of populist radical right parties.
These results clearly demonstrate that nationalism is not a unitary phenomenon within these two nations and moreover that beliefs about the nation cannot be arranged on a continuum from less to more nationalistic. On the contrary, the four types of nationalism are not 
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only discrete, but also cross-cutting in their attitudinal composition. As we shall see, adherence to these contrasting cultural models has important implications for people's political attitudes.
Despite the overall structural similarity between the four classes in France and Germany, there are some notable differences between them. The French liberal nationalists are much more adamant about the importance of civic criteria of national membership (language ability, respect for institutions, citizenship and subjective feeling) than German liberal nationalists, which is consistent with the dominance of the civic republican model in France. On ethnocultural criteria of belonging, the differences are more complex and reveal underlying differences that were not visible in the aggregate analyses: while the restrictive nationalists and the disengaged are somewhat less ethnonationalist in France than in Germany, French ardent nationalists (and to some degree liberal nationalists) exceed their German counterparts in favouring ancestry, native birth and lifelong residence as criteria of national membership. It is the higher prevalence in France of this particularly exclusionary type of nationalism that explains why the French sample is more ethnonationalist in the aggregate. Consistent with the aggregate analyses, religious definitions of the nation are less common across all four classes in France, though the differences are the smallest among the ardent nationalists.
Levels of national pride and hubris evidence some differences among the classes as well. The restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not the liberal nationalists and the disengaged) display higher levels of pride in Germany than they do in France, especially when it comes to the country's economic achievements. As was suggested by the aggregate analyses, the two exceptions to this are pride in history and the armed forces, both of which are likely affected by Germany's collective memory of the Second World War. Chauvinism is distributed similarly in both countries, except among the restrictive nationalists in France, who are less likely to view other countries in a disparaging manner than their German counterparts.
The above differences point to some country-specific features of nationalism, but these are overshadowed by the overall structural consistency in the attitudinal patterns that constitute the four classes. Nationalism in both Germany and France is a heterogeneous phenomenon, composed of four distinct attitudinal orientations towards the nation that appear to share more in common across national borders than within them. At a minimum, this finding lends credence to the view that 'far from being uniformly distributed in time and space, carrying an equal, banal meaning to all the members of the nation, nationalism might be consumed, articulated and mobilized differently by […] different subjects' (Antonsich 2016: p. 33) . The meanings with which people understand and enact their nationhood appear to vary considerably within nations, but do so in patterned ways. This opens the possibility of seeing everyday nationalism as reflective of underlying cultural cleavages that may shape social interaction and political mobilization.
The similarities in nationalism across the two countries suggest that there may exist a common repertoire of dispositions towards the nation that transcends national boundaries. If it is the case that a randomly selected French citizen is likely to imagine the nation in a manner more consistent with a similarly disposed German citizen than with another French compatriot, this calls into question the adequacy of analyses that treat culture as nationally bounded (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) . Moreover, this points to a possible extension to Billig's (1995) work: not only is the nation itself pervasive and deeply institutionalized, but the same may be true of the range of options available to everyday people for conceptualizing the nation's meaning.
Nationalism and Political Attitudes
The identification of multiple varieties of nationalism is relevant only to the degree that these attitudinal clusters affect other politically and socially relevant outcomes. Among the most widely discussed development in European politics of the past decade has been the rise of radical right parties that combine anti-immigration positions with Euroscepticism (Mudde 2007; Berezin 2009 ). In France, the National Front has received considerable support in local and regional elections and its leader, Marine Le Pen, has been a contender for the country's presidency. In Germany, the radical right has been more muted in
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Nationhood as Cultural Repertoire: Collective Identities … 165 institutional politics, but the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the National Democratic Party (NPD) have been gaining ground in state and European elections; furthermore, radical social movements have long been a prominent feature of German society. Given that nationalist appeals are central to the success of these parties, the four types of nationalism found in both countries should have implications for radical right politics.
The ISSP is not ideally suited for predicting support for radical right parties, however, because the survey only asks respondents about their voting preferences in general elections, rather than those held at the municipal or regional level. The German NPD and AfD have received only modest support in elections to the Bundestag, so the sample representing their voters is not large enough to enable meaningful analyses (only 10 German ISSP respondents report voting for the NPD and 54 report voting for the AfD). The National Front has been more successful in national elections, so the size of relevant French sample is larger, consisting of 179 respondents. The ISSP does not ask about support for radical movements outside of institutional politics. Consequently, I will analyse the association between nationalism and radical right support in France but not Germany.
Whereas data on party preferences are limited in the ISSP, the survey does allow for an examination of two sets of political attitudes associated with radical right support: anti-immigrant sentiment and negative perceptions of the EU. Questions measuring the former are available for the French and German samples, while the latter were only asked of the French sample. In addition, I will examine another correlate of nationalism, which is distinct from anti-immigrant sentiment: economic protectionism. Like anti-immigrant sentiment, economic protectionism is concerned with the penetration of nation state borders, but its focus is on capital and goods rather than people.
Immigration attitudes are measured by five items that probe respondents' agreement with statements about immigrants increasing crime rates, being good for the economy, taking away jobs from the nativeborn, bringing in new ideas and cultures and undermining national culture. All the items were recoded so that higher values indicated less favourable opinions of immigration; the variables were then summed
into a continuous scale of anti-immigrant belief (Cronbach's alpha: 0.80 for France, 0.74 for Germany). In addition, the survey features a number of EU-related questions; the present analyses rely on the most general of these, which asks respondents whether they agree that the country (in this case France) benefits from being a member of the EU. Finally, the economic protectionism item asks whether the country should limit foreign imports. Figure 3 presents the results of models that predict anti-immigrant attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany. In addition to cluster membership (corrected for misclassification error [Bakk et al. 2013] ), the models control for a range of covariates, including gender, citizenship status, religious denomination, religiosity, ethnicity, age and household income. The immigration attitudes are modelled using ordinary least-squares regression, while economic protectionism is modelled using logistic regression (the point estimates are expressed in terms of odds ratios). In both cases, a clear pattern emerges: the four varieties of nationalism are distinctly and significantly Fig. 3 Results of regressions predicting anti-immigrant attitudes and economic protectionism in France and Germany associated with the outcomes of interest. The disengaged express the lowest levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and economic protectionism, the ardent nationalists express the highest levels and the liberal and restrictive nationalists, respectively, occupy the middle ground. The effect sizes are larger in France than in Germany, but the same overall pattern holds in both countries.
Results from models predicting anti-EU attitudes and support for the National Front (both in France only) are presented in Fig. 4 . Here, the patterns are somewhat different than in Fig. 3 : the disengaged are no less likely to favour the EU than the liberal nationalists, while restrictive nationalists are more likely to express opposition to the EU than the ardent nationalists. It appears that the low institutional pride of the restrictive nationalists extends to supranational bodies, which they view with the greater scepticism than other French respondents. If both Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant sentiments drive support for radical right parties (Ivarsflaten 2008; Taggart 1998 ), then we should expect restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists to express similar levels of support for the far right: the restrictive nationalists due to their strong anti-EU sentiments and weaker anti-immigrant attitudes and the ardent nationalists due to their strong anti-immigrant attitudes and weaker Euroscepticism. Indeed, this is what we observe in the right panel of Fig. 4 : among centre-right and far-right voters, the difference in the probability of voting for the National Front between restrictive and ardent nationalists is not statistically significant (the standard errors are large due to the small sample size).
Together, these results suggest that nationalism is a robust predictor of political attitudes, even when controlling for sociodemographic covariates. Ardent nationalists, whose views are characterized by strong national identification, exclusionary definitions of national membership and high levels of pride and hubris, are the most likely to hold antiimmigrant and protectionist attitudes, while restrictive nationalists, whose exclusionary definitions of the nation's boundaries are not accompanied by high levels of national pride and hubris, are particularly critical of the EU (in France). Despite these differences, in the French context, both groups are equally likely to support radical right politics. In contrast, the disengaged are consistently more positively predisposed towards immigration and trade and more strongly opposed to the radical right (in France) than not only the restrictive and ardent nationalists, but also the liberal nationalists. It is only on attitudes towards the EU that the disengaged and liberal nationalists exhibit similar response patterns.
In sum, the nation continues to serve as a central point of reference for the French and for Germans, but its meaning varies within each population. Whether considering the role of supranational institutions or policies towards migrants, the policy preferences of citizens in both countries are, at least in part, filtered through their particular understanding of their nation in terms of its demographic composition, its institutional and human achievements and its place in the world.
The Path Forward
By inductively identifying clusters of survey respondents with shared attitudinal profiles, this paper has demonstrated that conceptions of nationhood are heterogeneous within France and Germany, the two nations often cited as exemplars of distinct nationalist traditions. Some cultural differences between the countries persist, to be sure, but once the within-country variation is accounted for, these differences become a matter of degree rather than of kind. For all their historical and institutional uniqueness, France and Germany are characterized by strikingly similar repertoires of nationhood, which correlate in similar ways with other political preferences, especially attitudes towards immigration and economic protectionism.
The approach employed here demonstrates that it is possible to engage in cross-national comparison without resorting to country-level cultural reductionism or to its converse, variable-based individualism. Latent class analysis and related sample decomposition methods allow for the detection of patterned variation in nationalist beliefs without making strong assumptions about the logical consistency of belief structures or their homogeneity within national populations. It then becomes an empirical question whether the resulting repertoires of nationhood differ more within countries or between them. In the case of France and Germany, within-country differences appear to be paramount.
If political beliefs and behaviours are partly shaped by the meanings people attach to the nation, as scholars of everyday nationalism have argued, then systematically mapping those understandings across countries is an essential first step in developing insights about the role of nationalism in modern democracies. To the extent that the lines of cultural cleavage related to nationalist beliefs are similar across countries, they may suggest similar explanations for common social and political outcomes, like intolerance towards ethnic minorities and support for radical-right parties. If so, the approach taken here promises to connect the micro-level of everyday nationalism with macro-level outcomes and to do so in a way that transcends the methodological nationalism of much research on this topic.
While this study illustrates the potential profitability of a repertoirebased approach to the study of nationalism, its findings raise further questions for future research. If nationalism is indeed characterized by discrete conceptions of the nation that coexist-and potentially compete-within countries, it becomes important to ask how these cultural models change over time. Are the repertoires of nationhood stable in their attitudinal composition or do the constituent attitudes vary with socioeconomic conditions? If the content of the repertoires is stable, what kinds of events might produce shifts in the relative prevalence of their component parts? Moreover, how do the tensions between these alternative definitions of the nation affect political change? Is it possible to think of these repertoires as indicative of deeply seated cultural cleavages that can be mobilized by nationalist elite discourse or that can pose challenges to existing political narratives of nationhood? Finally, are there circumstances under which the repertoires themselves undergo major change, possibly calling into question the logic of nationalism itself? To begin answering these questions, what is needed are more systematic longitudinal data on nationalist beliefs and political preferences, and also in-depth qualitative studies of the mechanisms that link conceptions of nationhood with politics.
This chapter began with a reference to Michael Billig's seminal work on banal nationalism, so it is fitting to conclude by asking how the perspective adopted here builds on Billig's insights. In the most general sense, this project is motivated by Billig's emphasis on the need to study nationalism in established rather than emergent nation states, in relatively settled times rather than moments of institutional upheaval and among everyday people rather than elites. The nation is a fundamental and deeply institutionalized object of political and cultural affiliation, but it is also a cognitive, affective and discursive frame through which people perceive and understand their reality and thus, with which they think, talk and act. 3 But institutionalization does not imply cultural homogeneity and consensus. All members of a national population may take for granted the existence of the nation state, but they need not agree about that nation state's meaning. Indeed, such disagreements may fuel ongoing political contestation within countries, which mayunder particular circumstances-lead to eruptions of nationalism's more volatile manifestations (what Billig calls 'hot nationalism'). If so, it is imperative that social scientists gain analytical purchase on the varieties of popular nationalism prevalent among national populations. This chapter demonstrates that survey research, when carried out in a manner that takes seriously the relationality of meaning, offers a useful complement to qualitative studies of everyday nationhood by enabling the identification and systematic comparison of cultural repertoires across social groups.
